The quagmire is back. From the CNN newsroom to the editorial page of The New York Times, the most loaded word in the English language is making a fashionable reappearance. Two weeks ago, Sen. Ted Kennedy, D-Mass., popularized the assertion that "Iraq is George Bush's Vietnam." Now Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W. Virginia, and the editors of Newsweek profess to hear the "echoes" of Indochina.
Applying the analogy of Vietnam to the war in Iraq is as powerful as it is fallacious.
Objectively measured, the scale and duration of the Vietnam War eclipse the scope of conflict in Iraq. The number of American troops stationed in Vietnam peaked at 536,100 in 1969. The official campaigns in Vietnam lasted over a decade, costing more than 58,000 American lives. Draftees comprised 30 percent of total combat deaths.
By contrast, the number of American troops currently stationed in Iraq is estimated at 135,000. After 13 months of conflict, the number of American soldiers killed in Iraq stands at 690. Clearly, the loss of individual servicemen is no less painful for the comparison. But statistical perspective is crucial to accurately evaluate the analogy of Vietnam.
But those who make the connection discount comparative casualty figures, because they believe Iraq to resemble Vietnam at a level that transcends number. Those that propagate the "quagmire" buzzword often acknowledge that the analogy is imperfect. But the disclaimer is seen as a technicality since a deeper essence is supposed to bind the destinies of the two conflicts, forboding implosion and humiliation in Iraq.
The move is a clever one, because it allows the pundits to reference a convenient isolationism. Minus context, specifics that appear similar are falsely generalized. Thus, the bloody uprising in Fallujah becomes the Tet offensive, and the suspect Gulf of Tonkin attack becomes the infamous search for WMDs. Guerilla insurgents and uncertain exit strategies are toted as proof for the relevance of Vietnam and the dismal fate of Iraq. The "echo" of familiarity is amplified.
But insinuation is no substitute for argument. The broader circumstances that motivated war in Vietnam and war in Iraq are too often dismissed or ignored.
Where are the superpower allies of the Sunni insurgents? American involvement in Vietnam crucially hinged upon the doctrine of containment: President Johnson felt compelled to hold the line against Soviet expansion. The escalation was fatally gradual precisely because he feared Soviet and Chinese intervention. But the factor of the powerful third state is entirely absent from policy decisions surrounding Iraq.
Equally important is the contrast between sustaining and changing regimes. In Vietnam, we inherited French imperialism. In Iraq, we deposed a hated dictator. Then, we supported an unpopular outsider who rigged his own elections. Now, we are installing a democracy with a fighting chance to prove itself.
The specter of Vietnam will continue to haunt us. The experience is seared on the American consciousness in ways I will never truly understand. But if those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it, those who misapply history are equally condemned.
Many anti-war activists and political opponents of President Bush would be delighted to see the situation in Iraq degenerate into a true quagmire. But the best guarantee that Iraq will never become Vietnam is the boldness of presidential resolve: "We will finish the work of the fallen." America must refocus on the task of maintaining order and transferring power to a legitimate Iraqi state, scorning distractions that are more political than relevant.
As we labor in the fog of war, we must not blind ourselves with false analogies.
Perry is a Plan II/government/philosophy sophomore.
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